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ABSTRACT: There is widespread dissatisfaction with the current modes of
paying for health care. Created by Prometheus Payment, evidence-informed
case rates (ECRs) are designed to create fair payments for all providers deliv-
ering care to a patient for a particular condition. ECRs would combine
global fees with an allowance for complications and performance incentives.
The authors model ECRs for two scenarios, acute myocardial infarction and
diabetes. Their analysis shows that, under fee-for-service payments, a high
proportion of the costs of care go toward potentially avoidable complica-
tions—some 30 percent of payments for acute myocardial infarctions and 60
percent of payment for diabetes care.They conclude that ECRs would hold
the delivery system accountable for the technical risk it imputes on the total
costs of care—for medical errors and potentially avoidable complications.
Further, ECRs would create incentives for providers to deliver care that is
safer, more reliable, and consistent with evidence-based guidelines.
* * * * *
Overview
Widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the U.S. health care
delivery system has led to calls for payment reform. Many proposals to
replace the dominant fee-for-service mode of reimbursement center on
episode-based payment. Interest in this approach comes on the heels of
increased use of software that groups care into episodes for retrospective
claims analyses and pay-for-performance efforts. Organizations such as the
National Quality Forum have convened experts to create a framework for
measuring the efficiency of care using episodes of medical care.1 Others,
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such as the Quality Alliance Steering Committee,
are developing ways to model care episodes. All of
these efforts are based on the concept that
accountability for the quality and efficiency of care
can be achieved only by tracking costs across all
providers treating a patient for a particular condi-
tion over time, as first conceptualized by Jerry
Solon and further refined by Mark Hornbrook.2
Prometheus Payment is a nonprofit corpora-
tion working to develop a new payment model to
improve health care quality, lower administrative
burdens, enhance transparency, and support a
patient-centered health care environment. It has
created an episode-based payment model, with
global fees to pay for all of the care recommended
by guidelines or experts for treating a patient
across the continuum of care.3 This includes care
delivered by physicians, hospitals, laboratories,
imaging centers, pharmacies, rehabilitation centers,
and other providers.These global fees are com-
bined with robust performance incentives designed
to promote cost control and quality improvement.
Specifically, a portion of payment is withheld and
redistributed based on providers’ performance on
measures of clinical processes, care outcomes, and
patient experiences.
The building blocks of this payment model
are evidence-informed case rates (ECRs). Under
these rates, providers receive a risk-adjusted pay-
ment to care for a patient diagnosed with a specific
condition across inpatient and outpatient settings.
Payment amounts are based on the resources
required to provide care as recommended in well-
accepted clinical guidelines. Prometheus Payment
assembled clinical working groups to develop the
first layer of ECRs in specific clinical areas, includ-
ing cancer care, chronic care, interventional cardi-
ology, and orthopedic care.The result of that
effort was published in a previous Commonwealth
Fund report.4
Throughout 2007 and early 2008, on behalf
of Prometheus Payment, we modeled ECRs to
determine the extent to which a fully priced
episode of care can be assembled in a way that
distinguishes between the different types of risks
embedded in the total cost of health care. In particu-
lar, we sought to separate probability risk from
technical risk.
Probability risk, the classic form of insurance
risk, is caused by the likelihood of a negative event
occurring to a patient as a result of his or her genes,
health status, and any external event not control-
lable by the provider (e.g., contracting a virus or
breaking a leg). In the Prometheus model, insurers
bear full financial responsibility for probability risk.
Technical risk is related to “care produc-
tion”; it is controllable by the provider and a result
of their clinical skills. Prometheus Payment defines
the negative consequences of technical risk as
potentially avoidable complications (PACs).
Examples of PACs among patients admitted to a
hospital for an acute myocardial infarction include
urinary tract infections, graft complications,
phlebitis, and even strokes. Both the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services and the private
insurer Wellpoint recently announced they will no
longer pay for some of these PACs.5 For patients
with chronic conditions, PACs include any hospi-
talization related to the chronic condition. For
example, diabetes patients should not need to be
hospitalized if their condition is managed properly,
even if they have multiple comorbidities. Providers
might argue that some PACs are not under their
control, but rather the control of another provider.
But the goal of an ECR is to pay for care across
the continuum, creating collective responsibility
for the management of a patient’s condition.
ECRs separate technical risk from probabil-
ity risk in order to hold physicians accountable for
the former but not the latter. As a result, providers
would carry some financial risk for patient out-
comes that are the result of poor-quality care. By
clearly delineating these two types of risk,
accountability for results can be assigned appropri-
ately to insurers and providers, as illustrated in Figure 1.6
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ing a weekend).We outline typical care using
clinical guidelines or expert opinion, as well as
analysis of medical claims data for AMI and
diabetes patients. Patients who have additional
conditions that meet the exclusionary criteria,
for example a patient with renal failure, are
removed from analysis.The claims for the
remaining patients are then aggregated into a
pool, named “typical cases and services,” and
used to model the base costs as well as costs
related to other cost modifiers in step 3.
Additionally, all costs associated with PACs are
segregated into a separate pool that will be
used in step 5.
2. Adjusting for regional variations in practice patterns:
This step will be taken when the models are
applied in pilot implementations. Adjustments
will take into account the regional rate of
PACs as well as the general intensity of
resource use, both of which may vary from the
national averages. Some might argue that mak-
ing these adjustments could enshrine regional
variations. Yet, convincing providers to accept
technical risk will be challenging enough,
without attempting to reduce variations in
regional practice at the same time. 
3. Analyzing the study population: Using the source
databases, we select patients with typical cases
and services and conduct univariate and bivari-
ate analyses to examine the associations of
costs with various comorbid conditions and
severity factors (e.g., congestive heart failure in
patients admitted for an AMI or hypertension
in patients with diabetes). We then perform
multivariable regression analyses to adjust for
severity and determine base costs of an ECR
and the quantitative effect of various cost
modifiers on that base.
4. Adding a 10% margin:We add a fixed percent-
age to the base severity-adjusted ECR for 
any patient.
5. Creation of the allowance for potentially avoidable
complications: Using the total cost of all PACs as
a base (as determined in step 1), we create a
Building Evidence-Informed Case Rates
Using two large national databases—an all-payer
facility charges database and a full claims dataset
from a cohort of 5 million insured Americans—we
created an ECR for an episode of acute medical
care, an acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and an
episode of chronic disease, diabetes mellitus of
type 1 or 2. The models determine the base ECR
for each of these two scenarios and identify factors
that inflate the base ECR. They define the bound-
aries of “typical” care and what constitute poten-
tially avoidable complications. 
Construction of an ECR is a five-
step process:
1. Defining the boundaries of an ECR: In this step,
we specify what constitutes typical care for a
particular medical condition. Typical care is
defined as care that is routinely expected to be
delivered to a patient, with or without comor-
bidities or other factors that necessarily
increase the intensity of services and are out-
side of the control of the provider (e.g., admis-
sion of a patient for an AMI to a hospital dur-
Total Cost of Care
Costs of all AMI Episodes
Costs of all 
Potentially Avoidable 
Complications
Costs of all 
Typical Episodes
Costs of all 
Severity Adjusters
Costs of all 
Base Services
Figure 1. Separation of Risk in the 
Prometheus Model
Insurer  –  Probability risk
Provider  – Technical risk
Patient  –  Probability risk
Note: AMI is acute myocardial infarction; severity adjusters 
inflate the core set of services based on factors such as whether 
the patient has congestive heart failure.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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pool for PAC allowances equal to 50 percent
of the total base costs. This money is spread in
a fixed and proportional way to each ECR,
creating an ECR-specific allowance for PACs.
This creates a significant incentive for providers
to reduce the number of PACs, since they get
to keep the difference between the allowance
and the actual cost of the PACs. For example,
consider a physician group that manages 100
diabetes patients covered by an ECR, in which
the average severity-adjusted base was $4,000
and the average PAC allowance was $1,800. At
the end of the year, if the severity-adjusted
cost of typical care averaged $4,000 and the
cost of PACs averaged $1,000, the physician
group would collect $80,000 from the portion
of the PAC allowance that was not used.
The ECR thus created starts when an
episode of care begins and a base case rate is paid.
Additional allowances become available for comor-
bid conditions and procedures that are included as
part of the ECR. Money from the pool designated
for PACs also becomes available, based on the
severity and complexity of the patient, to care for
any complications that may occur. Finally, incen-
tive payments are freed up as providers achieve
certain benchmark levels of performance. The
global nature of the ECR encourages providers to
coordinate care within an episode and limit dupli-
cation of services, thus creating a strong incentive
to eliminate errors and improve quality.
Modeling Results: 
Acute Myocardial Infarction
We applied the process described above to create a
model ECR for AMI. Table 1 illustrates the differ-
ences in costs between AMI cases that do not
include potentially avoidable complications, which
we refer to as typical cases, and ones that do. On
average, PACs add nearly $17,000 in health care
costs per case. PACs include infections and routine
complications from medical care incurred in hos-
pitals as well as avoidable complications specific to
the treatment of an AMI in a hospital, such as
hemorrhage or complications from a graft or
implanted device. The costs of these PACs vary
greatly, from a few thousand dollars for an allergic
reaction to medication to tens of thousands for
hemorrhage. Under the current payment system,
all of these costs end up in the hospital and profes-
sional claims charged to payers. 
Readmissions to the hospital within 30 days
for causes related to the prior AMI double the cost
of the original case. Overall, the readmission rate
was 10 percent and the total cost of readmissions is
approximately 9 percent of the total cost for all
AMIs. As a result, significantly reducing readmis-
sions would have an important impact on the total
costs of care.
Segregating the costs of typical care from
PACs allows us to better model the real effect of
the severity of a patient’s condition on cost, with-
out the added noise created by PACs. ECRs would
hold the delivery system accountable for the tech-
nical risk it imputes on the total costs of care.
Based on our study, the total cost of all PACs and
readmissions is significant, representing 30 percent
of the total cost of all AMIs—a considerable added
burden for payers. 
Table 3 illustrates the impact of the PAC
allowance on the total severity-adjusted ECR per
patient. Higher-cost cases receive larger PAC
allowances, but those funds represent a smaller per-
centage of the total cost of the case. This is
designed to increase the dollars allocated to man-
age potential complications for more severely ill
patients, while mitigating the potential for
providers to overstate the severity of a patient’s
condition in order to “game” the payment system.
Modeling Results:  Diabetes Mellitus
In the case of a chronic condition such as diabetes,
ECRs would cover a patient’s care during a 12-
month period, which is the period of eligibility
for commercially insured health plan members. 
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of costs
for patients with diabetes mellitus. As with the
model ECR for AMI, this model demonstrates the
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importance of separating the costs of typical care
from potentially avoidable complications. While
the total average cost for all patients with diabetes
is $6,000 per year, the annual cost for typical care
is only half this amount. The total burden of PACs
is approximately 60 percent of the overall costs of
diabetes care. As such, basing an episode payment
on currently observed averages would “bake in”
the cost of PACs—a scenario that Prometheus’
proposed payment model is designed to avoid. 
Additionally, the relative severity of a
patients’ condition has a significant impact on the
base episode cost. This makes it important to mod-
ify base costs according to the severity of illness as
well as demographic factors. Figure 2 summarizes
the total ECR for three typical diabetes patients.
Each variable, such as obesity or age, translates into
an inflation or deflation of the base cost. 
We also examined what health care services
were actually received by patients, to see whether
they were given all of the services recommended
by the clinical working group and designated as
the base ECR cost. According to the clinical rec-
ommendations, the total cost for typical medical
services (excluding pharmacy) that should be pro-
vided to diabetes patients is $1,311. Our analysis
Figure 2. Severity-Adjusted Base ECR Price for Three Patients
Variables Count Estimate
Patient 
1
Patient 
2
Patient 
3
Intercept 85,806 12.7962 1 1 1
RF3: Diabetes Mellitus-IDDM, Uncontrolled 5,105 1.0242 1
PH10: Statins and other antilipids 52,213 5.1273 1 1
PH1: Insulin 23,075 3.3478 1
PH6: ACE or ARB inhibitors 42,598 2.3672 1 1
PH5: Beta Blockers 28,202 1.5674 1 1
PH4: Antihypertensive combinations 17,950 2.0116 1
PH9: Antidepressants 21,412 2.6315 1
P15: Other diagnostic procedures (interview, 
evaluation, consultation) 62,627 1.0122 1 1
P10: Laboratory services 42,208 0.5809 1 1
RF5: DM with Hyperlipidemia, Obesity 25,375 0.4379 1
P6: Eye diagnostic and minor therapeutic 
procedures 7,919 1.1151 1 1
P13: Ancillary, home health, transport 4,469 0.6605 1
Age: 65-<80 vs. 50-<65 29,149 -0.4148 1 1
Age: 80+ vs. 50-<65 11,853 -1.0958
Gender: F = 1; M = 0 45,037 -0.4014
Typical Diabetes Care $1,311 $3,453 $9,375
Notes: Intercept represents the core cost of a patient with no severity factors; count is the number of 
observations in the analyzed cohort of patients; estimate is the statistical factor estimated by the regression 
model; and IDDM is insulin-dependent patient with diabetes mellitus.
Source: Author’s analysis.
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revealed that more than 90 percent of the patients
in the study cohort received only $311 worth of
services on average, an underuse of services
amounting to $1,000. Across all of the patients in the
study cohort, the cost for services that should have
been delivered but were not totaled $90 million. 
The base payment of an ECR—before
severity adjustments—is designed to cover all
health care services recommended by clinical
guidelines or expert opinion. This is meant to
address underuse, which has been demonstrated to
be a widespread problem in the U.S. health care
delivery system.7 To eliminate the underuse, we
added $1,000 to the ECR base and deducted $90
million from the total PAC costs, still leaving a 
significant amount in allowance per patient (Table 4).8
Implications
The model ECRs for AMI and diabetes reveal the
extent to which potentially avoidable complica-
tions are inflating health care costs. Extrapolating
from this analysis, we estimate that the total cost of
PACs across all U.S. patients could exceed half a
trillion dollars a year. Significantly reducing the
number of PACs could transform the delivery of
care in America, the ability to provide coverage to
the uninsured, and the economics of the delivery
system. 
Evidence-informed case rates would create
incentives for providers to improve care and avoid
complications. By clearly separating probability risk
from technical risk, we can pinpoint the costs due
to “production defects” and hold providers
accountable for them. Hospitals and physicians that
deliver highly reliable care (i.e., with very low rates
of potentially avoidable complications) could
explicitly warranty their work to send a clear 
signal to consumers and third-party payers that
they are delivering better care than their competi-
tors. A few experiments along these lines have
been successfully attempted.
In the early 1990s, a two-year pilot program
examined the impact of creating an episode-based
payment for knee or shoulder arthroscopic surgery,
including an explicit two-year warranty from the
surgeon that was guaranteed through a posted
bond. The total costs of the care episodes were
lower than historical averages, profit margins
improved for both the surgeon and the hospital,
and the number of complications decreased. The
warranty concept has since permeated the self-pay
portion of health care, including corrective eye
surgery and general cosmetic surgery, as well as
dental care. Still, it has taken more than 10 years
for it to be tried in the third-party payer system. In
mid-2007, Geisinger Health System of
Pennsylvania announced that it would provide a
90-day warranty for any complications that occur
as a result of elective cardiac bypass surgeries.
Under the program, a single price for bypass sur-
gery is charged, covering any pre-operative, opera-
tive, and post-operative expenses incurred up to 90
days after the surgery.
The scarcity of these examples demonstrates
the difficulty of achieving reliable care, as well as
the fact that providers are generally unwilling or
unable to put a price on a complete episode of care.
A transition model is necessary to move the
health care delivery system from the fee-for-serv-
ice payment system to a completely transparent
pricing system such as Geisinger’s. ECRs have the
potential to facilitate this transition by combining
payment for a core set of evidence-informed ser-
vices, adjusted for severity, with an explicit profit
margin and an allowance for potentially avoidable
complications. This allowance, based on currently
observed rates of such complications, would create
a powerful incentive for physicians and hospitals to
work together to reduce the rate of PACs. As
physicians and hospitals refine their care processes
to deliver more reliable care, they will emulate
Geisinger’s work and that of providers around the
country who are trying to reengineer care delivery
(e.g., Premier’s QUEST program and the American
Academy of Family Physicians’ TransforMED).9
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Recommendations
For payment reform to work, providers will need
to, first, acknowledge that current health care
delivery processes result in unacceptably high levels
of potentially avoidable complications and, second,
take steps to make care safer and more reliable. For
their part, health care purchasers must acknowl-
edge that fee-for-service payments are paying for
errors that hurt the plan members they insure. 
Evidence-informed case rates offer a solid
foundation on which to build payment reform.
Such reform will encounter resistance, because
every potentially avoidable complication is a 
revenue stream for someone in the health care
industry. Still, this payment model would encour-
age delivery of care based on the best clinical 
evidence, reduce the misuse, overuse, and underuse
of services, and offer incentives for providers to
focus on making care safe, reliable, and effective for
all patients.
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Table 3. PAC Allowance and Total ECR Price per Typical AMI Patient
Factors Avg Cost Number Total Cost
Total AMI cases (Facility Plus Professional) $53,206 13,977 $743,657,708
Claims for typical patients $40,712 7,246 $295,001,860
Claims for patients with PACs (including readmissions) $66,655 6,731 $448,655,848
Added Burden for PACs (including readmissions) $16,056 $224,419,314
Allowable Cost of PACs 50%
$112,209,657
Flat Fee Portion (spread 25% costs of compl 
over all cases) 25% $2,007 $28,052,414
Proportional Rate (75% of compl costs 
as a rate over base costs) 75% 15%
Factors Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Cost of Care of Typical AMI Case 
(Facility Plus Professional) $10,957 $43,915 $120,045
Allowance for PACs $3,628 $8,502 $19,761
Flat Fee Allowance (25% of compl costs 
spread over all) $2,007 $2,007 $2,007 $2,007
Proportional Allowance 15% $1,620 $6,495 $17,754
Margin 10% $1,096 $4,392 $12,005
Total ECR per Patient (severity + PAC allowance + margin) $15,680 $56,809 $151,811
Notes: AMI is acute myocardial infarction; PACs are potentially avoidable complications; ECR is evidence-informed case rate.
* The total PAC pool is split into two parts: one is distributed as a flat fee across all ECRs and the other is distributed on a pro-
portional basis. The first part is comprised of 25 percent of the total pool, in this instance $20 million. Since it is distributed
across 16,322 AMI cases, it amounts to a flat fee allowance of $1,258 per AMI. The second part is comprised of 75 percent of
the total pool, in this instance $62 million, which represents 15 percent of the total typical costs of AMI. As such, in this example,
every ECR will have a flat fee allowance of $1,258 and a proportional allowance of 15 percent of the severity-adjusted base.
Source: Authors’ analysis of insured member database.
12 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
Table 4. PAC Allowance and Total ECR Price per Typical Diabetic Patient
Factors Avg Cost Number Total Cost
Total diabetes cases $6,076 218,541 $1,327,855,116
Claims for typical patients $3,002 171,631 $515,236,262
Claims for patients with PACs $6,685 121,576 $812,735,560
Added Burden for PACs $6,685 $812,735,560
Evidence-informed adjustment 75% $700 128,723 $90,106,275
Allowable cost of PACs 50% $361,314,643
Flat Fee Portion (spread 25% costs of PACs
over all cases)* 25% $413 $90,328,661
Proportional Rate (75% costs of PACs 
as a rate over base costs)* 75% 41%
Factors Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Cost of Care of Typical Patients $1,311 $3,453 $9,375
Allowance for PACs* $955 $1,840 $4,286
Flat Fee Allowance $413 $413 $413 $413
Proportional Allowance 41% $542 $1,426 $3,872
Net Percent Allowance for PACs 73% 53% 46%
Margin 10% $131 $345 $938
Total severity-adjusted ECR per Patient $2,397 $5,638 $14,598
Notes: PACs are potentially avoidable complications; ECR is evidence-informed case rate.
* As the total severity-adjusted base cost of care increases (here from $1,311 to $9,375), the total dollar-based PAC allowance
per ECR increases, providing the physician with ample resources to care for the patient as their severity increases and, as a
result, as the likelihood of the development of a potentially avoidable complication increases as well. The total PAC allowance, as
a percent of the severity-adjusted base, decreases as the severity-adjusted base increases, partially as a mechanism to mitigate
against artificially increasing a patient’s severity factors.
Source: Authors’ analysis of a database of insured member database.
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